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they need another century of delving among vital endowments of nerve, of torturing dogs and frogs, to teach them that these facts utterly refuse to assimilate, except under the conceptions of *mind* and *matter*?

Rockport, Mass., March 5, 1875.

B. H.

Is Man a finite Being?

Mr. Editor:

In the October number, 1874, *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, Mr. Kroeger says: "If any finite being is immortal, i.e. continues to lead a self-conscious life throughout all time, it necessarily remains always more or less immoral, because it remains finite." Now, I ask Mr. K. if his hypothesis does not involve a contradiction? How can an "immortal" and "self-conscious" being, living throughout all time, be or remain finite? Is the term "finite" predicable of such a "being"? Or, rather, is the term "finite" predicable of "being" at all? Is it not a theological rather than a philosophical term, and one that has no place in the vocabulary of a science of pure "being"? If, then, the "being" assumed in the hypothesis is not finite, does not the corollary of "immortal immorality" reduce to zero?

North Lawrence, Kansas.

LIGHTSEEKER.

BOOK NOTICES.

German Rationalism, in its Rise, Progress, and Decline, in relation to Theologians, Scholars, Poets, Philosophers, and the People: A Contribution to the Church History of the 18th and 19th centuries. By Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, Professor of Theology in the University of Basle. Edited and translated by Rev. Wm. Leonhard Gage and Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. For sale by Gray, Baker & Co., St. Louis.

The so-called rationalistic movement is perhaps the most noteworthy in modern theology. At bottom it is the attempt to bring about a perfect unity between faith and insight. That it has generally proved a failure must be confessed when we compare its results with the ideal standard. When, however, we consider the value of these attempts in provoking reaction on the part of orthodox theologians, as well as in developing literature and science, we find the movement quite essential to the divine Purpose in world-history. In the middle ages the pantheistic interpretation of Aristotle by his great Arabian commentators threatened Christianity with an insoluble contradiction between Reason and Faith. Its effect was to stimulate into being a race of sturdy thinkers, among whom Thomas Aquinas stood preëminent and enunciated the speculative basis of the Christian faith in such terms as may stand for valid to this day. The growth of universities and the revival of learning date their birth in the great convocations assembled to hear the scholastic doctors present their theories of faith and reason.

Dr. Hagenbach gives a brief account of the rise of Rationalism in Germany, reviews the characteristics of the eighteenth century, sketches the strife between the Lutherans and Calvinists and the rise of Pietism. The accounts of Lessing and Zinzendorf are of especial value. Herder, Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Jacobi, Fichte, Richter, Goethe, Novalis, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, are discussed in ten chapters. In Chapter XXIV. the author treats of the rise of the Protestant spirit in the Roman Catholic Church during the past and present centuries.

The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition. By Robert Jardine, Principal of the General Assembly's College, Calcutta, &c. London: MacMillan & Co., 1874. For sale by Gray, Baker & Co., St. Louis. Price \$2.00.

The author of this work treats, *first*, The Acquisition of Presentative Knowledge, under the following heads: (a) analysis of perception; (b) analysis of sensations; (c) revival and association of sensations; (d) self-consciousness; (e) sensations as objects; (f) perception. His second topic is the various Theories of Perception as taught by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Kant, and the modern English thinkers. Under Descartes he treats also Malebranche and Spinoza. He regards the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume as "the *reductio ad absurdum* of representative idealism as found in Descartes and Locke." Among the modern English thinkers he discusses the doctrines of Hartley, J. S. Mill, Hamilton, &c. He concludes: "The only place Mr. Mill leaves for physical science is that negative, utterly tantalizing shadow of a thing which he calls 'the permanent possibility of sensations'! Idealism postulates an intelligent power as the cause of the existence and objective synthesis of sensations; and to this there is perhaps no serious objection, except that the language which is used frequently leads ordinary people to suppose that something very absurd is meant. Realism as found in Herbert Spencer, and as supported by recent investigations of science, demands a belief in real objective non-phenomenal forces, capable of correlation with and a transmutation into one another." His third topic is Representation. This he discusses under the heads: (a) condition of representation; (b) laws of representation; (c) kinds of representation—phantasy, memory, expectation; (d) imagination in science and art; (e) imagination in ethics and religion; (f) peculiarities of representation; (g) representation of abstractions. His fourth topic is Elaboration of Knowledge, considered under (a) predication; (b) intuition; (c) dependence of predication upon intuition; (d) the class, the concept, the name; (e) reasoning simulating inference; (f) determining ground of inference; (g) the form of inference; (h) evidence, induction, deduction; (i) conclusion.

The Logic of Reason. Universal and Eternal. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepherd, 1875. For sale by Gray, Baker & Co., St. Louis. Price \$2.00.

The author remarks in his preface that "A strong conviction that modes of Logic at present used can never attain to absolute knowledge, but must stop short in confirmed skepticism, puts an imperative duty upon us to seek out a better logic, by which known truths may be held forever sure." In his introduction he shows that facts of matter and facts of mind require one philosophy for their explanation, which philosophy is in reason and consequently the logical condition of all experience. Hence he proceeds in Part I. to consider the prominent forms of Abstract Logic: (1) logic of mathematics; (2) the syllogistic logic; (3) transcendental logic; (4) logic of force. The necessary limitations of mathematical logic and the defects of syllogistic logic in not being capable of formulating chemical combination and conversions of force, are well portrayed. It makes matter inert, and illimitable space and time unknown. Science and philosophy have gone beyond it. In the chapter on Transcendental Logic he reviews the

positions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, attributing to the latter the completion of this species of logic. After an exposition of transcendental logic he criticizes its defects, alleging for it (a) an empirical origin instead of self-development; (b) the ambiguity of its term "reason"; (c) its inability to give an ultimate moral rule; (d) or to admit of communication of human experience, or of a common space and time; (e) its denial of all force except thought-activity. While "Aristotle's logic cannot move, Hegel's cannot rest." "Neither can determine universal experience nor transcend it." He passes next to the "Logic of Force," which is that of Herbert Spencer and thinkers like him. In Part II. he comes to the "Logic of Concrete Universality," within which he investigates the "prerequisite conditions that made experience itself possible, and necessarily as it is." He applies this in three directions: (I.) Pure figure and inorganic bodies—(a) experience in pure quantity, (b) experience within concrete quality, (c) experience in concrete relation; (II.) Organic life and activity—(a) leading facts of life running through from conscious to unconscious agency, (b) leading organic facts in the vegetable kingdom, (c) in the animal kingdom, (d) in the human family; (III.) Absolute Being above all finite experiences—(a) prerequisite conditions for form, (b) prerequisite conditions for life, (c) human reason may know what is essential in absolute reason.

Like the former works of Dr. Hickok, this work is characterized by profound, original thought, and gives evidence of long study of the speculative systems which have been put forth by Kant and his followers.

The Logic of Style; being an Introduction to Critical Science. By William Renton. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874.

The following statement of the objects of the author in this treatise is made by the publisher:

"The object of the author in this treatise is to present once for all the fundamental principles of literary science. The distinction is made at the very outset between the mental sciences which are concerned with Sensibility, like Music and Literature, and those like Logic, which are not. The possibility of an *Æsthetic Science* of literature is then demonstrated; and the expansions, and advantages for other branches of mental science, of a theory of Style, indicated. This occupies the Introduction. In the body of the work, the principles of Expression generally are first of all treated; then Style is defined, in relation to Expression, as the 'differential in Expression'; and is contradistinguished from Rhetoric, which is the regulative and practical science of Style. More particularly, in Chapters II. and III. the ultimate relations of Style are specified, as Quality and Quantity. And here the science is shown to be the converse and complementary science to *Logic*. Its Quality founds on the same basis with that of Logical Quantity; literary effect being determined by the relations of Subject and Predicate. Here the catholic qualities of Style are defined and illustrated as *Subtlety* and *Comprehensiveness*, and the ordinary Logic extended into a new sphere by means of the *qualification of the Predicate*, i.e. in logical phrase, its 'quantification' in point of connotation, in so far as the connotation of Terms consists of a numerical aggregation of attributes. Then (in Chapter III.), the Proposition being shown to be the unit of length in Style, and to depend for its completeness on the Copula, the Quantitative relation in Style is exhibited as identical in its basis with Quality in Logic. The primary relation of Quantity

is that of Co-ordination, and its secondary, that of Subordination; which obviously fall to be treated of respectively as *Extension* and *Intension*. While the method of the work is thus formal, the illustrations are essentially of a literary interest."

Das Wesen des Universums und die Gesetze des Humanismus dargestellt aus dem Standpunkte der Vernunft. Von K. Th. Bayrhoffer. Ottawa, Ills. 1871.

The name of the distinguished author of this treatise will interest our German readers as the name of one who thirty years ago attracted attention as an able writer on the Philosophy of Nature. Mr. Bayrhoffer resides at present at Tonica, Illinois, and age does not appear to have abated his acuteness of insight—if we may form an opinion from the work before us, in which he discusses the world in view of the Spencerian Evolution-theory and the doctrine of the Unknowable. He does not understand how an evolution can be anything else than a gradual revelation and manifestation of an essence which is self-active in said evolution. Reason is essence, and not the unknowable, he thinks. The concluding portion of his treatise, relating to the social combination of man with man, and especially as regards "free monogamic marriage and family, democratic organization of labor, common schools, the democratic state, the union of peoples and of humanity at large," we desire to translate for our readers at some future time.

Life of Thomas Jefferson. By James Parton. Boston: James R. Osgood & Company. 1874.

Few writers have achieved a literary style so much to the American popular taste as Mr. Parton. In the present instance, just on the eve of so many centennial anniversaries of early events in our history as a nation, his labor is peculiarly edifying. We are fortunate if the renewed contemplation of the lives and surroundings of the patriots of that period shall serve to mitigate the bitter memories of recent civil war.

The Methods of Ethics. By Henry Sidgwick, M.A. London: MacMillan & Co. 1874. For sale by Gray, Baker & Co., St. Louis.

In the present work the author intends an examination, at once expository and critical, of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done, so far as they are to be found in the moral consciousness of mankind at large either in an explicit or in an implicit form, and have been developed by individual thinkers and worked up into systems that have become historical. With this view, he treats in Book the First upon the technical apparatus of the system, and discusses morality and law, pleasure and desire, free-will, egoism and self-love, intuitionism, the good, &c. Book the Second is devoted to the various phases of egoism; Book the Third to intuitionism; Book the fourth to utilitarianism. The author carefully avoids anything that may seem like a dogmatic decision of the points at issue, and endeavors to state fairly the processes of ethical thought rather than the results. While this procedure is very essential as a phase of the historical method, it is not satisfactory as the outcome of a complete system. Ethical thought must reach the springs of action, and in order to do this must show the supremacy of one set of moral principles. The will is only paralyzed by the contemplation of many uncanceled motives.